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Practicing lawyers in so progressive a country as America
are continually met with new devices, with new legal situation
with want of remedies, for which neither the text-books nor
their legal education afford ti em precedent or direct advice.
The most important of these novations of the law and society
is tha combination of capital in its many foris. We have
heard much of late years, ard in fact for all time, of the
danrers of corporations, capital etc. But now tlh legal pro-
fession is confronted by situationZ far more preplexi and
in .olvinv imnnense interests. Every student knows hc,- corpo-
rations have -rcn from a monastic instutition to the predomi-
nance they -ow occupy in the business :.orld; but K-nerican
ingenuity hias invms,-d a le'-al .1ctine1 V,1hich -. y s&allow a
hundred corporations or a _ui-r: tiousand indiviau-!s; and
then ;ith all t. s corpor te i->s,osib _it> t--eir united
power be closed like a cy-nafo ii:. portable compass , -. ",eild-
ed by o-.1 or two men.
Th- tendency of tK. day is towar.: co-r crate ag,"ri Tation
of capital and effort. T' liberal policy oi state Loveerrini4
allowin; te i onation of corporations under e eral laws
for an al!iost unlimited number of objects, facilitates an
ai: t'is te. -,a- cy. A lar e and constantly _ nc iincreasin
proportion of tr business of t;; 'oun.try has ccme to oe
transacted by these artificial a. encies. It is a lo _ical
sequence and matter of cormion observation that t- e ;-uLrer
of controversies involving this brancii of 7r1e law aanl re-
quiring settlement by thev-courts is increasin; and 'ill con-
tinue to increase. The develooment of resources has but
fairly begui:, and tne field in which corporatiori may operate
and imploy their capital to advantage is virtually unlimited,
Hence the lawv upon t?,is subject may Te said to be ii its
infancy.
Of course it is not evr: conabination o. capital t at
i illegal. We h ar a -.reat rteal about "Trusts", ,Cozi nes
"Monopolies", "Corners", etc., ii, thesL eys when cpital is
playing so i-,,eortant a part im, the history of our 2our try.
Every body is tal"kin. about trusts ant..
Under such circumstances it is h-ot suprisini tlct t els
of .o:r.inatioi. have been --reatly exa'-erated. The -cod
side has been overlooil.(i. '11 at tl ere is a good :ide to this
question as well as a bad one will not be disputed if an
investigation is made. Aw'ergntions of capital have mnmny
advantag;es aid may be weilded for tle public good. One of
the chief i-rems of benefit is tie cheapeninL: of the cost of
preduction. The dreai of every manufacturer is tto increase
his output vith th- same expenses or less if possible.
Under tn- consolidation one set of officers takes 'the place
of many. The increased capital enables than to buy in large
quantities and at opportune times.
From these remarks we may infer that there are at least
three ways of viewing these problems : the sentimental; the
economic; and the legal ways. In this thesis it is proposed
to treat of these combinations only from the legal point of
view. Courts only deal with the laws as they are; they
cannot make them. This leaves the other aspects of the
situation to be discussed by the le-islatures and the
people who alone can make the cahnges claimed to be necessary.
The origin of the word "Trust" seems to have been the
well known Standard Oil Monopoly. Th; defenders of the trust
point to this as a justification bot> of the need of the
invention and its practical success. In the Standard Oil
case there were a few men who had acquired a controling
interest in a few (at first) manufacturing or mining propertit
situated in different states. How could they manage them
all ? Not personally, for they wished to avoid personal
liability; not through numerous corporations, for, as their
acquisitions increased, it was seen that the whole time of
these two or three mn would be taken up by going about to
corporate meetings, publishing notices, placating stockhold-
ers, and complying with the (to them) vexatious restrictions
concerning corporate management of the several states. To
meet this inmergency the Standard Oil Trust was or.anized.
As a corporation cannot be created except by the
legislature, Hoadly v. County Conmissioners, 105 Mass. p.526,
Stone v. Flag, 72 Ill. 397. So it canrot without the author-
ity of the legislature merge its existence in that of another
corporation. (New York Canal Co. v. FYlton Bank, 7 Wend. 412.
Pearce v. Madisou, 20 How. (U. S.) 441. Clearwater V. Meri-
dith, 1 Wall. 25, 39. Previous to the so called "Trusts",
efforts to secure concert of action among corporations have
been principally made either,
1. By one corporation takin- stock in anther;
2. By one leasing the property of armther;
3. By contracts between the Boards of Directors, having
one or more common members ; and
4. By consolidation under general or special statutes.
Taking up the first method we find that one railroad
company canrt purchase shares of stock in another railroad
company, especially where the purchase is for the purpose of
cantrolling or absorbing the latter. (Cook on Stockholders
Sec. 315 b, Central Railroad Co., v. Collins, 40 Ga., 582,
Hazelhurst v. Savvannah Railroad Co., 43 Ga., 13. , Elkins
v. Camden and Atlantic Railroad Co., 36 N. 3. Equity, 5.
Morawetz says (p. 212), that the sale of the property of one
corporation to another in consideration of a transfer of
shares in the latter company to the share holders of the
former is clearly not impliodly authorized. A transaction
of thdis description would, in effect, amount to a consolida-
tion of the two comapnies, but he adds that a corporation may
sell out its assets, and receive in payment, stock in another
company having a fixed money value, and convertable irto
cash at any time. It may be distributed in specia among
t ose share holders who are willinu- to accept it, hut should
be controverted into cash and the proceeds aestributed anong
those who do not consent to th-e arrangement, This was
held in the case of Treadwell v. Salisbury anufacturinp Co.,
73 Mass. 393., where the corporation sold all of its prop-
erty to another corporation against the wishes of a minority
of the stock holders. This restriction on thus securing
control does not prevent a controlling xtock holder in one
corporation from becoming the controlling stock holder ir.
another. (Havemeyer v. Havemeyer, 43 Superior Ct., 506.
But the right to hold such controlling interests in different
compaines is conceded to be subject to remedies in a court of
equity if the rights of associates in either are prejudiced
by a breach of Iuty or of trust in the excercise of such
controll. In Pratt v. Jewett, 75 Mass. 34 it was held not
reasonable cause for dissolution of a manufacturinr company
that one person owned the majority of the stock, qnd for many
years has controlled the elections and mana.-ed tha company,
without regard to the wishes and interests of the petitioners,
and so as to result in a loss. sicon o AuoNivision l
iv -n . bei-I.. as i ratant as t. ot:~ we will -.. it to
iscuis and p.ro cee, to t- t'Ar .
We will now proceed to the third subdivision.
The directors elected to controll and manage the corpo-
rations are trustees of a franchise granted by the state.
They cannot vonvey away the corporate power to any external
bodies, nor bind the corporation by executory contract to ex-
ercise corporate powers in a manner inconsistant with the
property right of the stock holders. Hence all attempts
to secure concert of action among corporations by executdry
agreements between their boards of directors are somevwhat
uncertain, as may be seen in some of the pooling arrangements
between carrier companies. In the case of a trust if the
power to elect a board in each of several corporations is
secured, and lodged in one hand, no contract between the
several boards is necessary. Each corporation in such a
case is left in a legal fence free, and does not enter into
any contract in restriction of a frnachise; and it is conceiv-
ed that the conduct of neither board can be impeached on an
allegation that it had entered into any executory obligation
in the nature of a combination or consolidation an usurpation
of power.
The third division included pooling contracts. These
involve, in one fonm or another, embarrasments arising out
of the limits of the powers of ti7- corporations and their
8
directors, and out of the fiduciary relation of the directors
to stock holders, and the incopacity of a director in two
boards to sanction a contract between them. The fact that
stock holders have not hitherto been regarded as holding any
fiduciary relation to each other or to their conpany has lead
to the invention of the trusts of stock for the controll of
co rpo rat ions.
We will now consider the fourth division.
In a consolidation by statute the rights franchises and
effects what two or more corporations are by legal authority
and agreements of the parties combined and united into one
whole, and conmitted to a single corporation , the stock
holders of which are composed of those ( as far as they
choose to become such) of the companies thus agreeing,
this is in law a consolidation, whether the consolidated
company be a new one then created, or one of the original
companies continuling in existance with only larger rights,
capacities and property. (66 Ala. 656.) Reorganization is
a term generally used to indicate the formation of an entirely
new corporation for the purpose of purchasing the property
of another corporation, and superceeding it in business
without incuring any liability to its creditors. Morawetz
2 ed. 811. Whether the consolidating compaines are ex-
tinLuised or not depen-ds upon the legislative intent as
manifested in the statute under which the consolidation is
effected. (Central Railroad and Banking v. Georgis 92 U. S.
665; Bove v. The Junction Railroad Co., 10 Ind. 93.)
Corporations cannot be consolidated except by the express
sanction of the state. This sanction may be granted by a
general law or by the original charter of a consolidating
comapnies. 19 Wall. 241.
It seems that a subsequent ratification of an unauthor-
ized consolidation is sufficient, Bishop v. Brainard, 28
Ct., 289. The franchises of the consolidated coampny are
measured by the act authorizing7 the consolidation, whether
it describes the enterprise in terms and thus provides a com-
plete constitution, or refers to the charters of tn e old
companies expressly in corporating their provision or extend
them by implication. Moraweitz 2 ed. sec. 547.
Mode of consolidation. Where the statute provides for th
the mode of consolidation, every requirement must be strictly
complied with (Railroad v. Tharp, 28 Mich. 506. Mansfield
&c., Railroad v. Drinker, 30 Mich. 124.) But such compliance
will be presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary
and connot, be inquired into uollateraly. Swartout v. Rail-
road 24 Mich. 389. If the statute only uonfers the naked
power, the companies may agreement fix the terms.But no
consolidation can take place without some action fully author-
izing the same. (Mason v. Finch, 28 Mich. 282.) Power to
consolidate does not include power to lease, or enlarge the
power to convey lands conferred by the charter. (Mills v.
The Central R. R. Co.., 41 N. J. hquity.5). Archer v. Terre
Haute R. R. 10 2 Ill. 493. But under a general power to
consolidate with any. other company it may consolidate with
another company whose charter contains no such power.
Matter of Prospect Park R. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 371. And when
a consolidation is effected, the new company enjoys the same
presumption as to the rightfulness of its legal existence as
an original canpany. Belle v. Penn. R. R. 10 Atlantic 741.
The legislature cannot compel the consolidation of pyl-
vate corporation. ( Aasontv. Finch 28 Mich. 282, Penn. College
cases 13 Wall. 190, 212. ) Although it has plenary power in
this respect over municipal corporation. One Dill. Mun.
Copp. 4th Ed. Sec. 44. And it may compel a consolidation
under a governing statute giving it power to alter revoke or
annul charters. Penn. College cases 13 Wall. 190, Curative
acts validating defects in corporate organistions are generall
upheld where the legislature could have given the corporation
a valid corporation in the first instance. (Syracuse city
Bank v. Davis, 16 Barb. 188, Mitchell v. Deeds, 49 Ill. 416,
19.)
We now come to the consideration of trusts proper. A
"Trust" so called is it a vice to secure concert of action
among a number of corporations of similar interests, by
separating the voting power and the ownership of the stock,
in each one to a sufficient extent to concentrate the voting
power, and the ownership of the stock, in each one, to a
sufficient extent to concentrate the voting power of a ma-
jority of the stock in each corporation, in the hands of a
single committee or an association whose policy will there-
fore animate all the Boards of Directors so that the corporate
action of all may be indentical without contract. Under this
arrangement it is intended that the beneficial interest in
the stock minus the voting power shall rest where it was
before. The most recent as well as one of the best cases
on the law of trusts is the sugar trust case in 121 N. Y.
582. This was an action brought by the Attorney General of
the state of New Yo rk v. The North River Refining Co., for
a dissolution of its charter upon the fround that it had
exceeded its corporate powers by entering into the trust
agreement. The case was ably argues and taken to the court
of Appeals where the decisions against the company were af-
firmed, thus desolving the corporation. TIe purposes of the
combination, as stated in the trust deed, were : to furnish
protection against unlawful combinations of labor; to pro-
tect against inducements to lower the standard of refined
sugars; to promote the interests of the parties in all lawful
and suitable ways.
The point was raised that the company itself, in its
corporate capacity, had not entered into the combination,
hut only the share holders in their individual capacity.
The fact however that the trust deed provided for certain
things to be done by the corporation, and that these things
had been done, constituted a ratification by the corporation
of its share holders agreement and made the transaction
properly a corporate act.
The decision does not, however, directly answer the
inquiries as to what stock holders may individually do,
which is now one of the chief questions of practical interest.
Although this question is not answered the reasoning which
leads the court to answer in the negative the question whether
the corporation itself can as such transfer its powers to
a trust, is instructive as bearing on that question. The
court first asked what this defendant corporation had done
or ommitted. It concludes that it has renounced its powers
by trnasferring the power to make dividends, to go on with
business, and to mortgage the property to a third party;
this has been done by a contract to which the corporation was
a party, and not by the concurrance in choosing directors
who would hold those powers under a contemplated policy;
this contract having been made by the stockholders and trus-
tees acting as such at a corporate meeting by corporate
resolutions and attested by corporate instrumentality, must
be deemed a corporate act. In all this, acts of the stock-
holders are in element, but seem to be so treated because
they were done under corporate forms, and cooperated witi
corporate acts or ommissions in an actual divesting of cor-
porate powers.
Perhaps opinions will differ as to whether this reason-
ing will lead also to the conclusion that a trust is illegal
which is constituted by stockholders acting as individuals,
and seeking not to divest their corporations of powers, but
to secure a board of directors who shall exercise those
powers in the regular corporate mamner, and freely, but in
harmony of policy of other corporations. However this may
be, it seems clear that the court have not in any wise
directly impuned of validity of purly stock trusts, consti-
tuted by stock holders alone with intent to exercise regularly
and not to renounce the corporate powers and franchises.
This case carefully avoids discussing the problems of
p~litical ecomomy and combinations and monopolies in restraint
of trade and cornnerce. Tt takes the discussion out of the
catagory of criminal conspiracy and puts the decision on
the clear and strong civil ground of a renunciation of the
corporate powers by the act of the corporation. To quote
from Finch J. : "And so we have reached our conclusion, and
it appears to us to have been established that the defendant
corporation has violated its charter and failed in the per-
foymance of its corporate duties, and that in respect so
material and so important as to justify a judgment of disso-
lution. Having reached that resolve it becomes needless to
advance into the wider discussion over monopolies and compe-
tition and restraint of trade and the problems of political
economy. Our duty is to leave them until some proper
innergency compblls their consideration. Without either ap-
proval or disapproval of the views expressed upon t.}at
branch of the case by the courts below, we are enabled to
decide that in this state thefe can be no partnerships of
separate and independant corporations, whether directly or
indirectly through the medium of a trust ; no substantial
consolidations which avoid and disregard the statutory per-
missions and restraints; but that manufacturing corporations
must be and remain several as they were created, pr one under
The solution of this phase of Lce question will depend much
uppn the settlement of the much discussed problem as to
whether there is a substantial and vital destinction between
the aggregate of the individuals who compose the corporations
and the corporation itself; whether the members themselves
are the corporation.
The underlying question is whether there is for this
purpose a substantial and vital destinction between the
aggregate corporation and the individual. As yet the law
has no one answer to this question in all its forms, and it
will be hard to adjust it to all situations. For many pur-
poses ther are essentially different. Some text writers
have insisted strongly on the destinction; others have re-
pudiated it. Of the latter class Moraweitz is prominent.
In Vol. L. Sec. 27 he says : "The statement that a corpora-
tion is an artificial person or entity a part from its
members is merely a description in figurative language,
of a corporation viewed as a collective body; a corporation
is really an association of persons, and no judicial dictum
or legislative enactment can alter this fact." But at Sec.
232 he says : "In all cases it is indispensable that the
fiction of a corporate entity, a part from the individual
share holders, be preserved unimpared, in measuring and in
enforcing those rights and obligations which are of a corpo-
rate character."
In the case of Internation W. & T. Co., v. MeMonan 41
N. W. 510, it was held that the corporation could purchase
personal property from one of its members; the mrnber in
that case being its president. The court said. : "There is
nd legal identity between individuals and a corporation which
will prevent it from becoming a purchaser in good faith from
one of its members". Waterman on Corporations Sec. 3 said :
"The corporation has an existence separate and distinct frcm
the persons composing them, who cannot individually exercise
corporate powers, enfore corporate rights, or, as a rule be
made responsible for the corporate acts...... Tie property
of a corporation is legally vested in itself and not in its
members; as individuals they cannot, even by joining together
unanimously, convey a title to it. Nor man tt-ey miake a con-
tract that will bind it, or enfore by action a contract that
has been made with it. The artificialperson called the
corporation must manage its affairs in its own name as exclu-
sively as a natural person manages his property and btsiness."
Statutes on consolidation.
Under New York law the provision of Sec. 8 to 13 of the
business corporation las, corporations may be consolidated
where "they are organized under the laws of this state for
the purpose of carrying on any kind of business of the same
or a similar nature, which a corporation organized under this
chapter migh t carry on." This is done by the Boards of
Directors making an agreement to that effect, and submitting
it to the stockholders for their approval. It must be
approved by at least two-thirds of the stock in each corpo-
ration. Any desenting stock holder may apply to the
Supreme Court a nd obtain an appraisal of his stock, and
after teceiving the amount he ceases to be a member of the
corporation. By this method the old corporations cease to
exist and the new ones take their place, and enjoy all the
rights, franchises and privileges possessed by the original
corporation.
Under the United States law passed in 1890 we have
certain provisions aimed at the destruction of trusts.
Sec. 1 provides that every contract, combination in the
form of trusts or dtherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who
shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination
or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
on a conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not exceed-
ing Five Thousand Dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding
one year, or by both said punishments, in a discression of the
court. The U. S. Circuti Courts are given jurisdiction, and
all trust property intransit between the state may be con-
fiscated. This seems to apply only to trusts between the
states.
Sec. 1798 of the Civil Code is the one that gives the
Attorney General tie right to bring an action for the forfeit-
ure of the charter of a corporation where it has exceeded
its powers. It was under this section that the case of
People v. The North River Sugar Refining Co. 121 N. Y. 582
was brought. This section provides,
1. Where a corporation had offended against any pro-
vision of an act, by or under which it was created, altered,
or renewed, or an act amending the same, an applicable to
the corporation; or,
2. Violated any provision oL law, whereby it has for-
feited its charter or become liable to be dissolved, by the
abuse of its powers; or,
3. Forfeited its privileges or franchises, by a failure
to exercise its powers; etc.
On the criminal side of the question in this state we
have section 7 of the stock corporation law taken ir. connectin
with Sec. 158 of the Penal Code. Sec. 7 of the stock corpo-
ration la-w provides: *No stock corporation shall combine
with any other corcoration for the prevention of capetition."
The words in the Penal Code that apply to this question are
A -erson is guilty of a misdemeanor who conspires to cheat
and defraud another out of piperty, by any means which are
in thenselves criminal, or which if executed, would armunt
to a cheat, or to obtain money or any other property by
flase pretenses.
Durin : the last session of ths legislature this law
against combinations and trusts has bee strejthe~e . It
is Chapter 716 of t2r Laws of 1893, whIch are not 7ret 7ub-
lisi-ed. It provides against restra'int& cf tr-ae and mono-olie
both by inaividuals ad reroons as well as corp:orations.
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N.
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Under our constutional system of ,overnm-mt there are
no certain and adequat- legal means by which abuse of pri-
vileges of united capital. by r ersons and corporations for
con-mercial and industrial ,urroses can be racbez and rii-
died. If course much less serious ax@i threatenin, tendancies
ha-Ve been corrected by am'3nc Je1.ts to tnh constitution. At
the same ti.e one of the fundamental ideas of a ,overnment
upon equality of rights before the law a~n --reat individual
libertyis non-interference with purely economical matters.
Sunctuary la-islation is not favorJi by our people unless
it be confined to such speeches of business as are in tuem-
selves demoralizing and vicious. Tih4e peculiar res ults
which have folowed tle unrestricted wieldin - of power in-
herant in tne possession of a lar'e accumulation of wealth
was not foreseen fy the founders of this or ot _er modern
nations, and is not probable t'',t ani-r checks upon the exer-
cise of the powers could 'Lve been -1ovided evn if -uch
checks had been deeited advisahle.
A. has before ben sai¢ there i. a grciat deal of public
a Itation over tne problems involved in these --ituations,
and t vct there is considerabla exaggeration of the r-5sultin5
evils. I will here quote a fair speciLn of &dme of the
flights i which some indulge. '  "The older gospel of economis
sci.ence is bei. rapidly confuted by the developme-nts of
modern training. Formulas enunciated with oracular dogmatism
are every day falsified by experience, and the phdlosophy
of the closet is laughed to scorn by t-.2 finance of the
stock< exchange. Demand and supply no longer maintain a self-
adjusting equlibrium and prices, forced up an,! oan by sheer
leverage of capital, violate all the cannon of science by
ceasing' to bear a fixed proportion to cost of production.
Competition the talismanic force pointed to by theory as the
automatic regulator of the commerical machine, his client
by the antagonastic action of combination, and the vast
engines of cosmopolitan industry are captured and controlled
by the league forces of organized speculation. Theoretic
science is defied by the audacious juggelery of financil
experts, and its maxims are as much out of date in explain-
ing the perturbations of the money market asethose of the
Ptolemaic system in co-ordinating the teloscopic horizons
of modern astronomy." (Miss. E. M. Clerke in Dublin Review,
April 1389.)
But the mystery which in the minds of some obscures
this subject is a business mystery --. d not a legal o.e.
Each of te legal principal3s wl-ich have rendered these com-
binations possible is easily comprehended aci j'enerally
familiar. Nearly all of them have long been reco-nized and
frequently rind separately applie. The modern spirit of
organization has recently discerned th-, results that can be
worked out through the combination of these faciliar prin-
ciples; anI t.-: secrecy which has atten ided the operation
of the device is a .. atter of business policy si.-- !y.
There is at the present writinn an AIti-Truat Convention
b in ;. hid in Chicar-o. It is composed of represeritative men
from nearly all of th- states. It wa& brought about by Gov.
Nelson of Minnesota, wvro, in accordancw -oith a resolution
adppted by the Minn. legislature isluJ -i i-vitation to all
of th- states of the Union to take part ic f coai'er ace to
devise mealm to ov ,rthrov tru~t, :.d 1 o CLi. andvS a
anti- ivu6t law i, J9enounced as an 6at i.ts
result6 have been fruitless. T-As law a the cw2 quoted
as the U. S. T-i-t L M in tie .iivision i 1.,ar statutes.
Gov. N lson &y "W -t is ne ,ed, is a I:-'vr w"-iil ill ,
ate t' ; acts of thv trists , ch are illegal. It cui t to
-rescrine a -ort an, 1iin for:. of indict: int. I,- e.. er
to -implyfy the r4-lf-s of evidence in -uc ; cases the law
shoula p ovia& tha t certain visibl> acts of t trusts and
t eir ag nts shoul be acce-pted as prima facial evidence of
an illegal combine. The law sa-,ul , b2 ,.ade to clearly
define what is a monopoly of trade, - e le isltures of
t"-e various states must be look.,eci to for relief. While tI-B
Shenyii law is an experiment it will co as an e ~t. i wedge.
It is 1,cr us to nlar. upon it. It i. for us to devise a
plan to IiSft ;hi wo r forn oL the mcr n-ti-c.rist.
What is necess-ary is concerted action betweun the federal
ard state aut-.oritios. I suggest that t~ds convention ap-
point a pe..e.: comni tee on legislation, whose duty it
will be to devise sui table laws and meanis to h-ave t:In
passed."'

